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ABSTRACT PAGE
This thesis examines the ways in which public reaction to the impressment of American 
seam en and the perceived violation of America's neutral rights reflected the domestic 
political culture of the United States between 1800 and 1808 as well as the diplomatic 
challenges the Jeffferson Adminstration faced in its relationship with Great Britain in the 
years leading up to the War of 1812. The central focus of the thesis is the 1806 death of an 
American seam en, John Pierce, while he was serving aboard the sloop Richard. Pierce 
was killed off Sandy Hook, New York after the Richard was fired upon by the H.M.S. 
Leander, commanded by Henry Whitby. While not a victim of impressment, Pierce's death 
at the hands of a  Royal Navy ship demonstrated what Americans viewed as the constant 
threat their countrymen faced at sea, not because of dangerous weather or work, but 
because of the predatory nature of the Royal Navy. Historians have usually relegated the 
story of John Pierce to footnotes in their larger examinations of the causes of the War of 
1812. However, newspaper accounts up and down the Atlantic seaboard, as well as 
diplomatic correspondence and the rhetoric of political campaigns during this era highlight 
the significance of Pierce's death on the mindset of the American public and suggest the 
mounting factionalism between the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans that continued 
after the contested presidential election of 1800, playing itself out not only in the Court of 
St. Jam es but in the streets of cities like New York and Norfolk in 1806 and 1807.
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Introduction
John Pierce’s name has cropped up in a variety of histories of the Early Republic; 
however, it has usually relegated the to a footnote or a page in works on diplomatic 
relations between the United States and Great Britain, the maritime culture of the Early 
Republic or histories of the War of 1812. What is clear, however, is that the American 
public as well as politicians at home and abroad, understood at the time the powerful 
symbolism of Pierce’s death. This paper will focus on the impact of Pierce’s death on the 
political culture of the Early Republic as it developed from 1803 to 1812. Right up until 
the outbreak of the War of 1812, the story of John Pierce conjured up images of the 
violation of America’s neutral rights, the threat of impressment faced by American 
seamen and their communities at home, as well as the political factionalism of the Early 
Republic when political parties used Pierce’s name to stir up emotions for or against their 
platforms.
England’s King George III appointed Francis James Jackson to serve as minister 
to the United States on May 26, 1809. He was sent to Washington, D.C. to replace 
George Erskine, who had been working for more than a year to settle the diplomatic 
difficulties that had been exacerbated between the United States and Great Britain after 
the death and impressment of American sailors serving on board the U.S.S. Chesapeake 
in June 1807. President James Madison was interested particularly in deriving some 
satisfaction from the punishment to be meted out to the commanding officer of the 
H.M.S. Leopard, whom the American government believed to be responsible for the most 
recent act of aggression against American naval and merchant ships and seamen.
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Secretary of State Robert Smith had expressed his and the President’s disappointment in 
the concessions Erskine had been willing to make on behalf of his government, most 
notably that the Leopard's commander, Captain Salusbury Price Humphreys, had gone 
unpunished other than to be given the command of another ship.1
In October 1809, Jackson renewed efforts to settle the matter of the Chesapeake affair , 
“on the basis of the proposal of his predecessor.” By November 13th, Jackson had circulated a 
letter to his government and to British consuls in the United States that he had removed himself 
from Washington, D.C., and would remain in New York “to wait for His Majesty’s commands,” 
since Smith had made it clear that he would not accept any more correspondence from Jackson. 
Word of the letter had reached President Madison, as well as both houses of Congress by 
December. Newspapers reported by the end of that month that both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives had resolved to approve the Madison Administration’s decision to end 
discussions with Jackson. In those debates, both in the House and the Senate, the members 
reminded each other of the wrongs committed by the British government at the hands of the 
Royal Navy. American shipping remained vulnerable all over the world and so did American 
sailors. Neutral rights meant nothing and the actions taken by the previous administration and by 
Congress had backfired. Federalist member Elisha Potter of Rhode Island reminded his 
colleagues that “all our restrictions on our commerce operate in [Great Britain’s] favor.” He 
continued, “We have been insulted and plundered for fifteen years past by the belligerent 
nations.” The time had come for action, and on this at least, the members of both parties could 
agree, even if they could not all settle on the same method. Republican Samuel McKee of 
Kentucky asked, “What course was left for the Administration to pursue? Why sir, to either hang
1 Jam es Zimm erman, Impressment o f American Seamen  (N ew  York: Kennikat Press, 1966) p. 152.
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down their ears like the sluggish ass, and bear with patience Mr. Jackson’s flippant sarcasms, or 
cut them off in the manner they have done?”2
In the midst of these debates, members of Congress, such as Jonathan Fisk of 
New York, invoked “the murder of Pierce” to convince his colleagues on both sides of 
the aisle to resolve to support President Jefferson’s actions against Jackson, eventually 
culminating in the demand for his recall. Invocations such as Fisk’s had been going on 
in the chambers of government, the columns of American newspapers, and at the tables 
of taverns and political meetings since April 1806 to remind the public of the death of an 
American seaman, John Pierce. Pierce had been killed as a result of the actions of a 
Royal Navy ship, the H.M.S. Leander, when it fired on Pierce’s sloop, the Richard for 
failing to come to when ordered do so outside of New York harbor. That event was 
followed just over a year later by the deaths of more Americans when the H.M.S. 
Leopard fired a broadside at the U.S.S. Chesapeake in Norfolk, Virginia. In both cases, 
the Royal Navy justified its actions by claiming to be looking for contraband, and more 
importantly, deserters. It was the British government’s failure to make what the U.S. 
deemed to be appropriate reparations in that case that led to weeks of debate in both 
houses of Congress in December 1809, setting the stage for a declaration of war against 
England in June of 1812.
The thesis begins with a preliminary chapter on scholarly opinion since Theodore 
Roosevelt, not on the death of John Pierce, but on British deprecations against American 
seamen generally in the years leading up to the War of 1812. Chapter two covers Pierce’s 
death, the trial of Captain Henry Whitby, master of H.M.S. Leander, that followed, and 
especially American public opinion about Pierce and Whitby. The thesis ends with
2 Annals o f Congress, H ouse o f R epresentatives, 11th Congress, 2nd Session  (1809), p. 759, 778
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conclusions about the meaning of the death of John Pierce as one of the key factors, now 
largely forgotten, that propelled the United States into war again England in 1812.
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Chapter I: War of 1812 American Seamen and Anglo-American Scholarly Opinion
Two years after graduating from Harvard, twenty-four year old Theodore 
Roosevelt made a name for himself as a historian by completing and publishing his Naval 
History o f the War o f 1812. In it, Roosevelt highlighted the naval supremacy of the 
British Royal Navy on the eve of the so-called second war for American independence, 
having devastated the navies of Russia, Denmark, the Netherlands, France and Spain. 
Biding their time, the ships of His Majesty’s Navy spent the years after the Napoleonic 
Wars trolling European ports and trade routes in order to protect the mercantile interests 
of Britain and her colonies. According to Roosevelt, the British viewed the Americans 
as young upstarts, with a navy of no real consequence and therefore, no real threat to the 
Royal Navy. By doing this, the British navy had committed an error similar to the one 
made by their own army during the early years of the Seven Years War. Roosevelt 
argued that it was the British underestimation of the American ships at sea combined with 
“efficient ships and, above all, efficient men in them” that provided for an American 
victory.1
What made the American seaman ready for battle was not extensive experience 
fighting at sea. The American navy was in its infancy, had cut its teeth battling Barbary 
pirates at Tripoli and the world’s oceans during intense storms. The Royal Navy 
certainly had the upper hand when it came to combat experience on the high seas. And 
ethnically, according to Roosevelt, there was little difference between the two warring 
sides: “On the New England coast the English blood was as pure as in any part of
T h e o d o r e  R oosevelt, The N aval W ar o f 1812  (N ew  York: M odern Library, 1999) p 15-16.
2 R oosevelt, N aval W ar o f 1812, p. 17.
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Britain”.3 In fact, Roosevelt added in a footnote that the War of 1812 was “practically a 
civil war.”4 So what made the American sailor ready to stand up against Europe’s most 
powerful navy? “Thrown upon his own resources, he had learned self-reliance; he was a 
first-rate practical seamen, and prided himself on the way his vessel was handled.”5 It 
was not simply the nature, but the character of the American sailor that was nurtured in 
the ports of Annapolis and Baltimore and the oceans of the Atlantic and Pacific that set 
them apart. Roosevelt echoed the strong nineteenth-century belief in American 
exceptionalism: the work ethic and self-sufficiency that would guarantee the success of 
the United States Navy. “It was, perhaps, the Navy alone that thought itself a match, ship 
against ship, for Great Britain. . .  . The officers of the navy, with their strong esprit de 
corps, their jealousy of their own name and record, and the knowledge, by actual 
experience, that the British ships sailed no faster and were no better handled than their 
own, had no desire to shirk a conflict with any foe, and having tried their bravery in 
actual service, they made it doubly formidable by cool, wary skill.” Thomas Jefferson 
may have envisioned an American future embodied by the independent farmer, but 
Roosevelt understood that the descendants of the island nation they were fighting grew 
up by the sea, “off in a fishing dory almost as soon as he could walk.”6
Yet it wasn’t simply genes that prepared them for naval battle against their 
cousins across the pond. Roosevelt first mentions a cause for the War of 1812 early on in 
his naval history and stresses the significance of the British practice of impressment,
emphasizing the irony of that fact: “[B]y a singular turn of fortune, Great Britain, whose
3 R oosevelt, N aval W ar o f 1812, p. 16.
4 R oosevelt, N aval W ar o f 1812, p. 16.
5 R oosevelt, N aval W ar o f 1812, p. 17.
6 R oosevelt, N aval W ar o f 1812, pps. 17-18.
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system of impressing sailors had been one of the chief causes of the war, herself became, 
in consequence of that very system, in some sort, a nursery for the seamen of the young 
Republican navy.”7 While American seamen “feared nothing more than being impressed 
on a British ship,” they nonetheless persevered. In fact, according to Roosevelt, more 
American sailors served (and were therefore trained) on Royal Navy ships in the years 
before the War because of impressment than served in the U.S. navy at the same time. 
Without impressment, therefore, perhaps the Royal Navy would not have engaged such a 
formidable enemy when the time came. And ironic still, it was their shared ethnic 
heritage that put American seamen at risk of impressment in the first place.
Jesse Lemisch’s groundbreaking work on the role of the American Jack Tar in 
setting the stage for the American Revolution is essential for understanding the nature of 
the relationship between American seaman and the Royal Navy in the years before the 
War of 1812. According to Lemisch, the practice of impressment had been part of 
English maritime culture since before the Magna Charta and lasted for more than six 
centuries for the simple reason that it was cheaper than paying a wage that would have 
attracted men to the work in the first place. “Doubts occurred about its legality, and even 
more about its morality, but no one ever contended that it would be cheaper for the
o
Crown of England to hire its sailors at a full wage.” Not only was the pay bad, but the 
punishments for misconduct were worse on board ships where corporal punishment was 
common place. Seamen suffered from malaria and scurvy until the late eighteenth
7 R oosevelt, Naval W ar o f 1812, p. 19.
8 Jesse Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull: The Role o f N ew  York's Seamen in Precipitating the Revolution (New  
York: Garland Publishing, 1997 (rep.)) p. 16.
8
century.9 In an environment like this, death was an ordinary part of life, whether from 
shipboard illness, infections caused by the lash or the threat of death in battle. After all, 
these sailors were serving in the Royal Navy during times of war.
Not surprisingly, with conditions as distasteful as those faced by the seamen, 
desertion in the Royal Navy was a constant problem, one that they solved through the use 
of press gangs. Americans were already familiar with this practice before the 
controversies started brewing at the time of the Napoleonic Wars. Lemisch argues that 
the Royal Navy resorted less and less to impressment in the nineteenth century, claiming 
that the “Royal Navy was willing to employ men for work in tolerable conditions and for 
proper wages,”10 but this was clearly not the case, at least as long as Britain and France 
remained at war. American ships and sailors were targeted by the Royal Navy, searching 
for contraband and deserters on board merchant ships flying the stars and stripes of the 
United States.
Lemisch also found that not only were seamen affected by the press gangs, so was 
the colonial economy in port cities such as New York. Rumors about the arrival of Royal 
Navy press gangs would turn cities like New York and Boston into ghost towns as men 
stayed away to avoid the press. “Thus those who did not lose their liberty to impressment 
lost their property to it.”11 In this way, urbanites and seafaring men and women alike 
began to construct a shared identity that would align them politically in the years leading 
to the American Revolution. This shared mentality developed in the early 1800s as the
9 For a discussion o f  scurvy and th e  discovery o f m easures to  prevent it during th e  Age o f Sail, se e  
Stephen R. Bown, Scurvy: How  a Surgeon, a M arin er and a Gentleman Solved the Greatest M edical 
M ystery in the Age o f Sail (N ew  York: 2003).
10 Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull, p. 17.
11 Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull, p. 18.
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Royal Navy resorted to impressment once again, this time patrolling both the seas and the
ports looking for deserters and contraband.
In Lemisch’s even more well-known essay, “Jack-Tar in the Streets,” published in
the William & Mary Quarterly in 1968, he deals with the problem of class while
attempting to understand the culture of American seamen. Culling through British
admiralty laws, colonial statutes, as well as the memoirs of men who had spent time at
sea, Lemisch views seamen, considered “wards” of the Admiralty court, as a special case
whose very words, movements, alcohol consumption, and time ashore were controlled by
the ships’ masters. He describes this relationship as paternalistic and argues that men on
board American ships were bound as much by class as those on land. Most seamen were
not allowed to vote. Statutes prohibited actions that would harm the interests of the
ships’ masters, even at the expense of their crews. In this way, seamen, regardless of
their race, were subjected to harsh treatment and “unfreedom” in much the same ways as
1
African-American slaves.
In Lemisch’s second examination of American seamen, he once again emphasizes 
that most Americans suffered because of the treatment of sailors at the hands of the press
1 'Xgangs. After all, he writes, “just about everyone had a relative at sea.” But as he also 
points out, not all Americans responded in the same way or for the same reasons.
Colonial governments reacted because merchants suffered when ships refused to enter 
their ports, afraid of losing their own crews to the press gangs. Their supplies of goods 
diminished and in turn they were forced to raise prices. During the Napoleonic Wars, 
Americans complained loudly about the political and economic consequences of
12 Jesse Lemisch, "Jack Tar in th e  Streets: M erchant Seam en in th e  Politics o f Revolutionary America" in 
W illiam & M ary  Quarterly  25 (1968) p. 380.
13 Jesse Lemisch, "Jack Tar in th e  Streets," p. 381.
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impressment and ship seizures, but rather than decrying the actions of the rowdy seamen 
who protested their treatment, they joined in, at least in print.
Linda Colley notes that the ethnic background that so many Americans shared 
with their British counterparts in the Royal Navy, both during and after the Revolutionary 
War, complicated the relationship between captors and captives. “Whether British or 
American, they had to deal with opponents whose skin colour and clothing was often the 
same as their own, and who might well speak the same language, worship the same 
Protestant God, react and think much of the time in very similar ways.” This was the 
case both during the Revolution and the years that followed. “So the imaginary wall that 
normally descends in war brutally separating one side from the other proved in this one 
sometimes markedly unstable. Men and women would glance at those who were in name 
and fact their enemies, and find themselves staring at a mirror.”14
The Americans, who had grown up reading the captivity narratives of their fellow 
colonists who had been captured by Native Americans, now composed their own stories 
of captivity, recognizing the lack of difference there as well. Colley relates the stories of 
captured American seamen brought to England during the 1770s. The novelty of the 
presence of these victims among English society soon wore off when “To satisfy the 
curiosity of some ladies, who had never seen a Yankee, as they called me. I went in, and 
they seemed greatly surprised to see me look like an Englishman; they said they were 
sure I was no Yankee, but like themselves.”15 However, Colley notes that in most of 
these kinds of narratives, descriptions like the one above were followed by accounts of 
incidents where “the reverse was true.” Instead, it was often the captive sailors who
14 Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire & the World, 1600-1850, (N ew  York: Anchor Books, 2004) p. 217.
15 John Blatchford, quoted  in Colley, Captives, p. 218.
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noted the differences between themselves and their captors, usually concluding with 
some kind of description of their patriotism and unbounded loyalty to the American 
cause, highlighting their independence even as they were held captive. In this way, as we 
will see in the case of the Americans impressed during the era of the Napoleonic Wars, 
their actions became politicized—in this case by themselves, in other cases, by the 
American public who supported them.
Jesse Lemisch first suggested that it was not only the sailors who faced 
impressment whose actions were politicized when they rebelled against their treatment at 
the hands of the Royal Navy, but the American public as well, especially those who lived 
in cities along the Atlantic. This was particularly true in the years leading up to the 
American Revolution and helped to fuel the fires of resentment toward the British in 
cities like Boston as tensions began to rise in the 1770s. For many merchants, the impact 
was financial. Ships refused to sail to certain ports under threat of being boarded by 
Royal Navy cruisers or having their crews kidnapped while on shore. The economy 
suffered too. If goods were not delivered to American cities, than supplies often ran short 
and prices rose as a consequence. So even while Lemisch pointed out that protests 
against impressment was a matter most Americans could back because most families had 
someone at sea, the impact on the colonists’ pocket books was surely felt just as 
seriously.16
As far as colonial governments were concerned, however, while the press gangs 
and Royal Navy were at fault, the political response of local legislatures and governors 
was not meant to forge an alliance between seamen and the colonial state, but to protect 
local economic interest and to preserve order. In Boston, in the 1740s for example, the
16 Lemisch, "Jack Tar in th e  Streets" p. 385.
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legislature took action to change the conduct of the Royal Navy while protecting law and 
order along with the city’s maritime economy. This was the proper way to stage a 
protest, not through violence or mob action, which was clearly part of the story. “The 
House spoke for the merchant, not the seamen.”17 Boston mobs rioted for two days in 
response to Commodore Charles Knowles’ efforts to press men into service on board his 
ship in 1747. According to both Lemisch and Pauline Maier, impressment became even 
more common in the years following the Seven Years War. Lord Admiral Alexander 
Colville, former commander in chief of British vessels in North America, ordered his 
ships to press men into service from Maine to Delaware in 1764, and as Maier points out, 
“mobs met the ships at every turn.”18 By 1775, the British often used impressment as a 
means to punish colonists in port cities from Maine to Virginia for their increasing 
resistance to British authority.19
We shall see whether this was the case decades later, during the Napoleonic Wars, 
when local and state governments dealt with the Royal Navy and British government not 
as British colonists, subject to the authority of Parliament and king, but as representatives 
of the sovereign United States. In the 1790s, British merchants complained when the 
press gangs sailed into town that they too suffered economically. “Merchants were soon 
complaining that sailors were in such short supply that sixty ships bound for the 
Caribbean and other destinations could not sail.”20
The British, in turn, politicized the practice of taking prisoners. While we 
normally associate this with prisoner exchanges, Colley includes the act of imprisoning
17 Lemisch, "Jack Tar in th e  Streets" p. 387
18 Pauline Maier, "Popular Uprisings in America" in W illiam & M ary  Quarterly  27 (1970) p. 9.
19 Lemisch, "Jack Tar in th e  Streets" p. 393.
20 Nathan Miller, Broadsides: The Age o f Fighting Sail, 1775-1815  (N ew  York: W iley, 2001) p. 107.
13
colonists as well. A year after the war ended, the British government began to refer to 
captives taking in the war with the American colonies as “prisoners-of-war.” Before that, 
they were officially referred to as “the King’s misguided subjects.” As Colley notes, the 
difference in meaning was clear. To acknowledge the captives as prisoners of war was to 
acknowledge the independence of the colonies and the prisoners as agents of this new 
state. Britain defended her actions by claiming that treasonous subjects would have faced 
much more “savage penalties conventionally visited on rebels” rather than what Colley
91believes were the true political motives of the language employed by the Crown.
Colley’s discussion of the treatment American captives received at the hands of 
the British during the American Revolution is revealing for the proximity of these acts to 
the events leading up to the War of 1812. Stories about British cruelties toward 
American “patriots” circulated for years in American newspapers, taverns and wherever 
working men gathered, even after the war ended. The Napoleonic Wars and the 
increased pressure the Royal Navy felt to man their ships was less than a quarter century 
removed from those cruelties. Most Americans had a long memory when it came to their 
war for independence. In a nation, too, where so much of the population had been young 
when the war was fought, they were still around in 1803 to remember 1776. And those 
who led the fight, not only on the battlefields, but in the chambers of Independence Hall, 
had become the leading men of the Early Republic.
These leading men took sides in both domestic affairs and foreign relations, 
particularly in the 1790s and 1800s. The United States sought to avoid becoming 
embroiled in European affairs in order to concentrate on domestic concerns as the 
fledgling nation worked to established both economic and political stability in the years 
21 Colley, Captives p. 219.
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following the Revolutionary War. Unfortunately for the young nation, the desire for 
economic development often led directly to involvement in the ways and wars of Europe. 
The country found itself taking sides more than once during its first three presidential 
administrations.
Much recent scholarship has focused on the question of impressment and its
impact on the political and economic cultures of the Early Republic. Denver Brunsman’s
recent essay entitled, “Citizens vs. Subjects: Impressment and Identity in the Anglo-
American Atlantic,” examines the ways in which Americans formed a conscious
delineation between their status as citizens of the United States and their understanding of
00  • •the relationship of a British subject to the authority of the Crown. Brunsman highlights 
the fact that by the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, the federal government had begun to 
provide sailors with protection papers, establishing their status as American citizens. It 
became clear to the Royal Navy, relatively quickly, that forged documents were being 
carried by British subjects to avoid press gangs and seizure on board American merchant 
ships. Brunsman points out the it was true that there were many British sailors 
“disguising” themselves as Americans by carrying fake protection certificates, and that 
the existence of these falsified documents, the British government argued, justified the 
search and seizures conducted by the Royal Navy. They simply had no choice. In order 
to conduct successfully their war against Napoleon, the Royal Navy had to resort to 
impressment to man their ships.
The rhetoric of revolution, according to Brunsman, took on a special kind of 
meaning for the maritime community in the Early Republic. Few Americans experienced
22 Denver Brunsman, "Citizens vs. Subjects: Im pressm ent and Identity in th e  Anglo-American Atlantic" in 
Journal o f  the Early Republic 30  (2010).
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the physical consequences of “subjecthood,” (in this case compulsory naval service) in 
quite the same way as seamen. Members of the Federalist Party argued that Thomas 
Jefferson and his fellow Republicans overstated the extent to which impressment affected 
the American public (that really only a small number of Americans were pressed into 
service in the early 1800s), politicizing it to cause a breach in the relationship between 
the United States and Great Britain. But Brunsman’s real focus is the way in which the 
actions of the Royal Navy contributed to Americans’ national identity. “To be an 
American citizen was a choice, not an obligation.” All kinds of Americans could back a 
war with Britain in 1812 not because they had family members who had been impressed, 
but because the violation that American seamen suffered at the hands of the Royal Navy 
(in actuality or in theory) was a threat to the liberties of all American citizens. It was the 
freedom from that kind of coercion at the hands of their own government that set them 
apart from their British cousins.
Other historians, Brunsman notes, have downplayed the political fervor expressed 
by the American public as reported in the Democractic-Republican newspapers of the 
Early Republic. He describes these public expressions of outrage and opposition reported 
in the press as links in the chain of a developing national identity. But Americans were 
not simply identifying themselves against what they termed the “subjecthood” of Britons, 
they were drawing political lines at home as well. Even if the Republicans were willing 
to use impressment as a way to gain political support among those men who could vote, 
most of those affected most intimately by the practice of impressment were not 
traditionally those with a political voice. They were the descendants of the mobs who
16
protested impressment during the colonial era, the ones whom colonial legislations 
condemned for being unruly and impolitic.
17
Chapter II: The Death of John Pierce and the Trial of Henry Whitby
Jesse Pierce described the incident that took place on Friday, April 25, 1806 
between his ship, the Richard and the H.M.S. Leander commanded by Captain Henry 
Whitby in an affidavit sworn before New York City’s Mayor DeWitt Clinton on the 
following day. Pierce, master of the Richard, stated that at about 5:00 in the evening, as 
the ship was approaching Sandy Hook, about a quarter mile from the shore, “two shots 
were fired at different times by a large British ship of war with two tier of guns supposed 
to be the Leander.” The first shot landed short of the Richard, while the second flew 
beyond the vessel by about 40 yards. The Leander had time to send a third shot toward 
the Richard, striking the “tassel rail and the quarter rail, and killed immediately the man 
at the helm named John Pierce,” the brother of the deponent, Jesse. Jesse Pierce stated 
that he was then able to “enter the hook without any further molestation.”1
A second affidavit was sworn to by the master of the brig Sally. Hezekiah Pratt 
affirmed that there were three Royal Navy ships at the entrance to the hook and that 
“upward of a hundred shots were fired at the said vessel by the said ships of war.” He 
could not attest to the fact of John Pierce’s death, however, for he “had no personal 
knowledge” of the injury to Pierce or any other deckhand. His own ship was about 330 
feet away from the Richard when the incident took place. That same day, Mayor Clinton 
submitted the affidavits to the City Council which quickly resolved, in light of the 
“atrocious murder of a citizen of the United States and the daring aggression upon our 
national rights” to pay for the costs of interring John Pierce on Monday, April 28th. The 
Council members stated their intention to attend the funeral “in a body” and requested
1 The M orning Chronicle (NY), April 28, 1806.
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that “the captains of all American vessels in the harbour to hold their colors half-mast” 
that day. Bells were to ring throughout the city to commemorate not only Pierce’s death, 
but to draw attention to the national dishonor suffered by Americans at the hands of a 
British naval captain who had violated the country’s neutrality rights.
Following Pierce’s death, the seafaring community kept a close eye on Whitby’s 
movements. The British too, were concerned about his well-being, quite from the start. 
“This affair is of so delicate a nature, and so much involves the character of a meritorious 
officer, that we ought to be cautious of prejudging it upon the materials before us.” The 
papers announced that Captain Whitby had been indicted by a New York grand jury on 
murder charges. When Henry Whitby died in the summer of 1812, the National 
Intelligencer reported his death: “Henry Whitby, age 30. . . who commanded the 
Leander. . . when she fired on one of our coasters and murdered John Pierce, an 
American sailor. He was later promoted for this HUMANE and honorable act to the 
command of his majesty’s ship, Britonl” Perhaps that kind of rhetoric was not 
surprising given that the war with Britain had commenced a month before, but clearly the 
memory of John Pierce continued to be imprinted in the minds of Americans as it was 
reprinted in their newspapers seven years after his death.
In that same year, 1812, a fictional account of the trial written by William 
Sampson featured Henry Whitby being brought before the grand jury, whose members 
included “Stephen Seeclear”, “Jonathan Feamot”, and “Jasper Trueblue” on March 17, 
1807. Sampson, an Irish barrister and a Protestant, who had arrived in the United States 
after being deported first from Ireland and then from England for his participation in the
2 M orning Chronicle (London), June 4 ,1 8 0 6 .
3 N ational Intelligencer (W ashington, D.C.) July 2 8 ,1 8 1 2 .
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Irish Rebellion of 1798, his support of Irish Catholics in that rebellion, and as a member 
of the United Irishmen, described Whitby as standing “mute” and picking his teeth with a 
toothpick pulled from his pocket and humming a “couplet of which the only words I 
could hear were “Britannia” and “bulwark.” Clearly, Sampson imagined a Whitby with 
no respect for the law. Sampson’s prosecutor asks the jury to consider two points: first, 
whether Whitby “occasioned] the death of John Pierce” and secondly, “Did he kill him 
of malice aforethought?” 4
Not only did Captain Henry Whitby face charges in the U.S. but he was also 
brought before a Court Martial on board the H.M.S. Gladiator docked in Portsmouth 
almost a year after the incident at Sandy Hook took place. He appeared before the Court 
on April 17 and 18, 1807. Whitby had submitted a report of the incident to his 
commanding officer at Halifax, Admiral John P. Beresford, on May 6, 1806. The 
commissioners who recommended the inquiry stated that “an American seaman was 
unfortunately killed” when a sloop failed to adhere to a first shot fired to warn a number 
of American ships that they needed to come round to be boarded. They believed that an 
inquiry was warranted because of concerns that Whitby had violated the neutrality rights 
of the United States, “a state in amity with his Majesty.” But Whitby was also tried for 
the “willful murder” of John Pierce, a “citizen of the United States” who had been 
“feloniously killed and murdered” by a shot fired from the Leander, under Whitby’s 
command.
tV»In his letter dated, April 30 , Whitby expressed to Bereford his concern that some 
of his men had been detained because of their participation in the events of the 25th. “I
4 William Sam pson, Trial o fCapt. Henry Whitby, fo r  the murder o f John Pierce, with his dying declaration 
(N ew  York: 1812) p. 19-22.
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am much surprised that the officers sent on the service should have been so unlawfully 
kept. . . You, sir, must be well aware, that the death of that unfortunate seamen could not 
be attributed to them, or to any other cause but accident.”5 Despite this denial, the Royal 
Navy determined that Whitby should face the tribunal. Appearing to give evidence 
against Whitby were several American sailors, including Jesse Pierce, the brother of the 
seaman killed in the incident. Jesse Pierce was asked to describe the incident for the 
Court. He testified that he could see three ships as he was coming into Sandy Hook from 
the south and that his own ship was not alone. He described the action taken first by the 
Cambrian, “as he got in just at the back of the middle ground.. . she fired and brought 
several vessels to, and then stood offshore with her head to the eastward.”6
It was at this point that the Leander, Whitby’s vessel, sailed in even closer than 
the Cambrian “firing all the way at several vessels.” Pierce explained that one shot 
landed in front and one in back of the Richard, “this caused me to think she was firing at 
me.” He next brought the ship to, but before the crew of the Richard could get the 
mainsheet aft, the Leander fire again, hitting the tassel-rail and quarter-rail.” This 
testimony echoed the one Pierce gave to the magistrate in New York the previous year. 
His brother was killed, according to Pierce, by the shot that hit the quarter-deck. He 
closed by saying that he got the ship into port between 8 and 9 o’clock and “informed the 
consul.”7
After his statement, Pierce was questioned by the Court and cross-examined by 
Whitby. He was asked the time of the incident and how far from the beach the ship was
5 H. W hitby to  J.P. Beresford, April 3 0 ,1 8 0 6
6 T estim ony o f Jesse Pierce, "M inutes taken at a Court Martial assem bled  on board His M ajesty's Ship 
Gladiator in Portsm outh Harbour" in The Naval Chronicle 18 (Jun-Jul 1807) accessed  on July 15, 2010  at 
http://w w w .royal-n avy .org .
7 T estim ony o f Jesse Pierce, "M inutes taken at a Court Martial."
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at the time. The Richard according to Pierce, was about half a mile from the shore, while 
the Leander was a mile and a quarter beyond the Richard. Pierce was asked if he knew 
Captain Whitby. He replied that he did not know him “at the time my brother was 
killed.” He had not heard an order to fire, nor did he know if Whitby was on board the 
Leander at the time. He conceded, when asked, that someone else might have given the 
order to fire. He testified that he had been standing within six feet of his brother when he 
was killed and saw that he had been struck “under the jaw.” He was asked once again the 
name of the ship that fired on the Richard. “It was from the Leander, as I am informed, I 
did not know the ship, it was the largest of the three.” When given the opportunity to 
cross-examine Pierce, Captain Whitby asked whether any other ships were firing. Pierce 
answered that he could not say, but when pressed further, he told Whitby that he did not
o
believe that either of the other ships were “within gun shot.”
The trial continued with the testimony of Caleb Brewster, captain of the Vigilant, 
Jonathan Lewis Brewster, an accountant at the New York Customs House, and a New 
York branch pilot, Robert Mitchell. Brewster had been sailing near Sandy Hook on the
tVimorning of April 25 . At half past ten, he “discovered three men of war. ..  they bore 
about S.E. betwixt one, two, and three leagues distance.” Later that afternoon, he saw a 
number of sailing vessels moving up along the Jersey shore heading for Sandy Hook. He 
also saw the three men of war, the Leander, the Cambrian and the Driver, head toward 
the shore. He stated that he “knew the ships, I have been all around them fifty times.” 
The Leander passed the Cambrian and “began to fire on the brig Sally.. . and the sloop 
Richard.” Brewster testified that the Leander fired about 10 shots before the Driver 
joined in and fired several times. “I don’t know what she fired at: she then hove about
8 Testim ony o f Jesse Pierce, "M inutes taken at a Court Martial".
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and stood to the southward and the eastward, in the same direction the other two had 
done.” 9 He saw the hole in the Richard's mainsail and watched the sloop head toward 
New York.
When questioned, Brewster said that he did not see the shot from the Leander hit 
the Richard, but that it was “the only ship firing at the time.” He stated too, that the 
Leander was the only ship that fired at the Richard and the Sally. The Court was trying 
to determine the distance between the ships and the shore. Brewster’s testimony 
corroborated Pierce’s, but the Court questioned Brewster further: “Do you know the 
distance of the jurisdiction of the States from the shore?” Brewster answered, “Three 
miles, I believe.” When asked how he knew this, he answered, “I understood that was the 
treaty as made by Mr. Jay.” Clearly skeptical that Brewster should have firsthand 
knowledge of the details of the Jay Treaty, the Court asked if he had read the treaty, to 
which he replied, “Yes, I have read them all.”
The Jay Treaty was signed in November 1794. It was primarily a commercial 
treaty that provided for the regulation of trade between the United States and Great 
Britain. Its connection to Whitby’s trial, however, had to do with the establishment of 
neutral rights should one of the parties go to war. The treaty was one of the first attempts 
on the part of the new federal government to negotiate with the British to deal with 
unfulfilled aspects of the Peace of Paris in 1783. The United States was still waiting 
for the British to abandon posts in the western territories now claimed by the Americans. 
The Jay Treaty was also meant to settle the maritime disputes that continued between the 
two, particularly to protect American seamen from impressment and to protect American 
shipping and trade. So the parties agreed to a “treaty of amity, commerce, and
9 T estim ony o f  Caleb Brewster, "M inutes taken at a Court Martial".
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navigation.”10 The treaty deepened the lines of faction that were beginning to take shape 
in the United States and that played themselves out in the press over the death of Pierce 
and other seamen. These are generally considered to be the primary causes of the War of 
1812 as well. The Federalists continued to support negotiation with the British, while the 
Jeffersonian Republicans were inching their way toward an embargo of British trade.
The Jay Treaty did not provide for a “distance of jurisdiction of the States from 
the shore” as Brewster was questioned about by the tribunal at Whitby’s court martial. It 
did, however, state that “the subjects and citizens of the two nations shall not do any acts 
of violence or hostility against each other.”11 By invoking the Jay Treaty, Brewster could 
simply have meant to remind the tribunal of the promises the two countries had made to 
each other when the treaty was signed in 1794.
Donald Hickey argues that, while flawed, the Jay Treaty enabled American
tVicommerce to truly develop during the last decade of the 18 century, with exports 
jumping from $33 million in 1794 to $94 million by 1801. Not only that, but the treaty 
protected the United States from a “nation whose naval power could menace the United 
States.” For Hickey, the only downside of the treaty was its impact on American 
relations with France, “who regarded it as a betrayal of the alliance that had bound them 
to the United States since the Revolution.” The United States was forced to test its navy 
out against the French, not the British, in order to secure commercial interests, 
particularly in the West Indies. The Quasi War with France ended in 1800, resulting in a 
promise from the United States not to seek reparations for losses incurred at the hands of
10 "Treaty o f Amity, C om m erce and Navigation b etw een  His Britannick M ajesty and th e  U nitedStates o f 
America by their President w ith th e  Advice and C onsent o f their Senate (Jay's Treaty)" (1794) A ccessed  
S eptem b er 5, 2011 . h ttp ://ava lon .ya le .law .ed u /18th _cen tu ry /jay .asp .
11 Article XXI, Jay's Treaty (1794).
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French ships in exchange for being released from the treaties signed at the end of the 
Revolution.12
The Napoleonic Wars would lead the United States down that often treacherous 
diplomatic path once again in 1803, when hostilities between France and Britain 
resumed. Most scholars agree that it was the endless need for what seemed an endless 
supply of men to serve aboard Royal Navy ships that led to the problem of impressment
• ITin the first place. British naval commanders were given orders to patrol the seas 
looking for deserters or for British men impressed into American service. Hickey points 
out that American ships did seek out British sailors from time to time to join their crews 
when they were undermanned. This was a direct result of the expansion of American 
commercial interests and overseas trade in the years following the American Revolution. 
The evidence clearly suggests that British seamen were willing to join American crews 
because the pay and the working conditions were universally known to be better than 
what the Royal Navy and even British merchant ships could offer.14 Treasury Secretary 
Albert Gallatin estimated that “perhaps half the able-bodied seamen in the American 
marine” were actually British sailors. The laws of naturalization which were simple and 
clear to the Americans, were denied by the British, who argued that a man did not “shed 
responsibilities to his native land by migrating to another.”15
The British justified their actions quite simply, especially early on. Refusing to 
accept the concept of naturalization on constitutional and sanguinary grounds, the British
12 Donald R. Hickey, The W ar o f 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Illinois: 1995), p. 6-7; Jam es F. Zimmerman, 
The Impressment o f American Seamen, p. 116; Bradford Perkins, The Cambridge History o f  American 
Foreign Relations, Vol. I (Cambridge: 1993), p. 123-125.
13 See  Brunsman, "Subjects vs. Citizens"; Robert E. Cray, Jr., "Rem em bering th e  U.S.S. Chesapeake: The 
Politics o f  M aritim e Death and Im pressment" in Journal o f the Early Republic 25 (Fall 2005).
14 Hickey, The W ar o f 1812, p. 11.
15 Perkins, Cambridge History o f American Foreign Relations, Vol. 1 p. 121-122.
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believed that once you were bom a British subject, no act of law could change that status. 
You could not be naturalized as the citizen or subject of another government. This, they 
argued, was a simple matter, particularly when it came to those seamen who had been 
bom before the onset of the American Revolution. By 1803, this would have meant any 
man who was as young as twenty-years old, since to be an American one had to be bom 
in the country since 1783.16 There were men on board American merchant ships who 
would have been in their teens. This did not necessarily make them safe, however, 
because the shared ethnic traits of British and American seamen, who spoke the same 
language (more or less), worshipped the same God, and drank the same rum, often made 
it difficult for American sailors to prove their citizenship. What a young Theodore 
Roosevelt had seen as an advantage for American sailors in the war threatened their 
status and safety in the years leading up to it.
In an attempt to protect vulnerable sailors, the federal government passed the “Act 
for the Relief and Protection of American Seamen”, which provided for the issuance of 
Seamen’s Protection Certificates. The certificates were issued locally by the customs 
collectors at ports throughout the country. Seamen had to request the certificates and 
they were granted only after proof of citizenship was provided and 25 cents were paid. 
Eventually, the men only had to bring a witness willing to swear before a notary that they 
were who they claimed to be. Sailors aboard merchant ships were not required to carry 
them. The certificates included the sailor’s name, age, place of birth, and distinguishing 
physical features. A certificate issued for Timothy Snow in 1805 out of New Bedford,
16 Jon Latimer, 1812: W ar with America (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007) p. 17.
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17 • •described him as “light complection, has a small scar on his left hand.” The British 
government claimed they were very easy to forge and so rarely recognized them as 
legitimate.
Press gangs were given their numbers and sought to hit those targets swiftly. Jon
18Latimer describes “nearly 1,000 seamen were taken in a single night” on the Thames. 
Within twenty years, the Royal Navy had grown from 16,000 to 145,000 men by the War 
of 1812. Impressment was the best solution to the manning problem the Navy faced 
because crews on board merchant ships were already trained, and, as Latimer points out, 
“the Royal Navy itself provided little training.” Desertion was clearly a problem for the 
Royal Navy as well. The men sought on board the Chesapeake a year after Pierce was 
killed by the Leander were suspected of being deserters. Rather than being a result of the 
poor conditions and harsh treatment seamen faced aboard Navy vessels, Latimer argues 
that it was better economic opportunity more than anything else that convinced men to 
desert. Why enlist with the Royal Navy for an indefinite period of time, risk loss of rank 
or pay, or wait for months if not years to be paid in the first place? As a consequence of 
the needs of the Royal Navy, American seamen found themselves relatively easy prey, 
particularly after 1803.The Whitby trial continued with the defendant given an 
opportunity to cross-examine Caleb Brewster. Again, Whitby tried to establish that no 
one could positively attest to whether the shot that resulted in Pierce’s death came from 
the Leander. “Do you mean positively to swear, that the shot fired from the Leander was 
directed at the sloop in which John Pierce was killed?” In other words, could Brewster 
confirm that this was a premeditated act on the part of Whitby and his crew? Brewster’s
17 Seam en's Protective Certificate o f Timothy Snow, M artha's Vineyard M useum , accessed  9 .15 .11  
http ://w w w .m vm u seu m .org /in d ex .p h p
18 Jon Latimer, 1812, p 16-17
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testimony described the event in much the same way as Jesse Pierce had, that the shots 
had landed in front of and behind the Richard, the ships’ distance from each other, and 
the ships’ distance from the shore. Next, Whitby took another route to establish his 
innocence. He asked whether the American merchant ships had brought to close enough 
for the British boats to board them to search for deserters and that those ships, not the 
Richard were the intended targets of the Leander's warning shots, but to no avail. 
Brewster continued to affirm that to the best of his knowledge, the shots were fired by the 
Leander and that the Richard was the target.
Finally, Whitby addressed the question of jurisdiction. “You have stated to the 
court, you have considered the neutrality three miles from shore, do you know that I was 
furnished with such instructions?” Brewster answered that he did not know. “How long 
since is it the treaty was made, or was it in existence at the time the Leander was there?” 
asked Whitby. Brewster answered, “I judge it was.” Finally, Whitby asked Brewster if 
he knew whether any other treaty between the two countries was in effect at the time of 
the incident. Brewster replied, “I do not know; it was said that Mr. Munro was 
negotiating in this country; but what was done I don’t know; it was the opinion at that 
time.”
James Monroe had served as U.S. minister to the Court of St. James since 1803. 
By 1805, he was increasingly frustrated by the treatment American vessels received at the 
hands of the Royal Navy. Over fifty ships had been seized by the British and it was 
Monroe’s responsibility to advocate for the ships’ owners and crews and submit protests 
on their behalf to the British government. In a letter dated August 20, 1805, Monroe 
wrote to Secretary of State James Madison about a recent meeting with the British
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Foreign Secretary, Lord Mulgrave. Mulgrave had served as Foreign Secretary since 
January of that year, and Monroe had met with him several times to discuss the seizure of
thAmerican vessels. Monroe had complained to Mulgrave as recently as the 16 of August 
that the British response to American protests was unsatisfactory and had asked for
i.L
another meeting to discuss the matter in person. They met again on the 19 and on the 
following day, Monroe addressed Madison: “I had an interview with Lord Mulgrave. . 
.which, I am sorry to observe, presented the prospect of a much less favorable result than 
I had anticipated from the previous one. “19 After two formal protests, Monroe was still 
awaiting some kind of satisfaction in the fall of 1805. He sent a letter to Lord Mulgrave. 
However, since he still had received not even a response to his protests by that time, 
Monroe turned his attention to his own government, emphasizing to Madison that the 
U.S. needed to adopt “an attitude of menace” with a “determination to execute it if 
necessary.” In other words, the U.S. needed to demonstrate to the European powers 
that they meant business.
It was quite clear to Monroe that a resolution between the two parties was 
becoming more impossible. The British had no intention of allowing American merchant 
ships to trade with the French on any terms. At the same time, the United States 
contended that the British could not and should not interfere with the commercial 
interests of neutrals. However, in a letter dated September 25th, Monroe told Madison 
that he believed that the British were trying to appease the Americans to a certain extent 
by dismissing the cases against ships seized for trading in the French colonies. “It is 
evident to those who attend the trials, that the tone of the judge has become more
19 Jam es M onroe to  Jam es M adison (August 2 0 ,1 8 0 5 )  in The Writings o f James M onroe  (N ew  York, 1900).
20 Harry Am m on, James M onroe & the Quest fo r  National Identity  (Charlottesville: 1990) p. 250.
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91moderate, that he acquits whenever he can acquit one of our vessels.. By October of 
1805, Monroe included the problem of impressment in his discussions with Lord 
Mulgrave. He noted that President Jefferson’s hope that there would be some 
conciliation on the part of the British, possibly by making examples of those captains 
responsible for seizing American ships, was unfounded. In fact, Monroe wrote on 
October 18 , “Captain Bradley of the Cambrian, whose conduct had been most offensive, 
has been promoted . . .to a command of a ship of the line.” On the contrary, it seemed to 
Monroe that outrages committed against American ships actually helped Bradley advance 
up the ranks of the Royal Navy. Monroe believed this to be the case; although a transfer 
to a frigate meant more prize money for an officer, a shift to a ship of the line “may 
perhaps be deemed a more important trust by the government.” Clearly, Monroe noted, 
Bradley was acting as an agent of the British government when his crew seized American
99ships and impressed American sailors and was being duly rewarded for it. And as 
noted in the American version of Henry Whitby’s death notice in 1812, he too had been 
promoted to the command of the H.M.S. Briton for his “honorable” actions against John 
Pierce and the Richard.
Monroe and his family were anxious to return to the United States and had been 
given permission to do so in the fall of 1805 by President Jefferson. However, Monroe 
felt pressured to remain in London until acceptable terms could be negotiated. He 
noticed an increase in the number of American ships taken into custody and the lack of 
response from Mulgrave moved Monroe to stay longer than he planned. Monroe further 
believed that the British were using the war with Napoleon as a means to an end. “I am
21Jam es M onroe to  Jam es M adison, Septem ber 2 5 ,1 8 0 5 .
22 M onroe to  M adison, O ctober 1 8 ,1 8 0 5 .
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inclined to think that the delay which has been so studiously sought in all these concerns 
is the part of a system, and that it is intended, as circumstances favor, to subject our 
commerce at present and hereafter to every restraint in their power. It is certain that the 
greatest jealousy is entertained of our present and increasing pros-perity, and I am 
satisfied that nothing which is likely to succeed, will be left untried to impair it.” No 
longer did Monroe believe that the British were likely to appease the United States in 
these matters. Instead, his dealings with the British cabinet had led Monroe to conclude 
that the British were biding their time, waiting, once again, to see “what the U.S. will 
bear.”23
And so, Monroe advised Madison that the time was ripe for the U.S. to resist the 
British and their policies. The British had far more to lose than they were willing to 
acknowledge. The relationship with the U.S. was essential to their commerce, not to 
mention that the British colonies depended on American trade. Was the time right, asked 
Monroe, for the U.S. to take a hard stance against both Britain and Spain? Monroe’s 
answer was yes. By November, he wrote to his colleagues in Spain and the Netherlands 
that he hoped to sail home in time for the President to address Congress.
On January 27, 1806, President Jefferson forwarded to the Senate a set of 
documents from the State Department pertaining to American relations with Great Britain 
regarding neutral rights. In his report to the President and the Senate, Madison argued 
that the measures taken by the British against American ships were “unjustifiable,” 
particularly the seizure of vessels, the method of search, which “compel [s] the vessel to 
send her papers in her own boat, and sometimes with great danger from the condition of 
the boat and the state of the weather,” and finally, the practice of impressing “persons
23 M onroe to  M adison, O ctober 1 8 ,1 8 0 5 .
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from American vessels, sailing under the American flag, on the high seas.”24 Soon after, 
President Jefferson prepared to send William Pinkney to London. In the meantime, the 
death of William Pitt had brought a glimmer of hope to Monroe who believed that both 
Charles Fox, the new Foreign Secretary, and Lord Grenville, held the United States in a 
more sympathetic view.
By the summer of 1806, as far as Jefferson was concerned, all talk “of an alliance 
with Britain, and the American rapprochement with the mother country that had begun
9 Awith Jay’s Treaty a decade earlier now came to an end.” Instead, Congress passed the 
Non-Importation Act of 1806, which banned the importation of British goods also 
produced by Americans. This Act would not take effect until November 1806. In the 
meantime, Jefferson was preparing to send William Pinkney to work with James Monroe 
to come to some sort of an arrangement with the British government that would address 
the federal government’s, as well as the American public’s, concerns about the treatment 
of their merchant ships at the hands of the Royal Navy.
Monroe was not pleased by the arrival of Pinkney. His presidential ambitions had 
fueled his hope that he could negotiate a more favorable commercial arrangement with 
the British government. He reported to both Jefferson and Madison during the spring of 
1806 that the tide was beginning to turn in favor of the U.S. But, as Ammon points out, 
the dispatches sent to the State Department and the White House by Monroe did not 
include any kind of settlement regarding impressment. A concession was reached that 
would have allowed neutral ships some access to European ports, but before word
24 Jam es M adison, "Report from th e  Secretary o f State to  President Jefferson" in The Annals o f Congress 
Senate, 9 th Congress, 1st Session  (January 2 5 ,1 8 0 6 )
25 Am m on, James M onroe  p. 251.
26 Gordon W ood, Empire o f Liberty: A History o f the Early Republic, 1789-1815. (Oxford University Press, 
2009) p. 644.
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reached Washington, Congress was nearing passage of the Non-Importation Act. 
Monroe was able to continue talks with Fox because much of the Act was not going into 
effect until November of that year.
The negotiations would not include Charles Fox, however, who became ill during 
the summer and died on September 13, 1806. Instead, the British chose Lord Henry 
Holland and Lord William Auckland to join the American commissioners, Monroe and 
Pinkney, to determine the commercial future of Anglo-American relations. Madison’s 
instructions to the two Americans were perfectly clear: there could be no agreement 
between the two nations without an end to the practice of impressment. In exchange, the 
United States promised to return British deserters on board Americans ships to the Royal 
Navy. Ammon argues that given the prominence of this issue in the state department’s 
instructions, it was clear that this was the “primary obstacle to a settlement.” While the 
British commissioners promised they could come to some sort of arrangement, they 
asked the Americans to work for the suspension of the Nonimportation Act as a show of 
good faith. President Jefferson announced in his message to Congress on December 3, 
1806 his belief that delaying the implementation of the Nonimportation act would “yield 
to arrangements of mutual consent and convenience.” Jefferson, therefore, recommended 
the “suspension of this act for a reasonable time, on considerations of justice, amity and
77the public interest.” While this request was followed, the British promise to end 
impressment was not. The Cabinet claimed that they did not believe that the U.S. would 
follow through on their promise to return British deserters.
As most scholars have pointed out, Jefferson insisted to Monroe and Pinkney that 
ending the impressment of American seamen was one of the most essential parts to
27 Thom as Jefferson to  Congress in Annals o f Congress, 9th Session (D ecem ber 3 ,1 8 0 6 ).
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negotiating terms with the British government. It was clear, however, to Lords Auckland 
and Holland that any insistence on ending impressment was a non-starter, and they were 
able to convince the Americans to table that demand. The treaty as it was eventually 
presented to Jefferson was never sent on to the Senate, in part because the problem of 
impressment was dropped by Pinkney and Monroe. Hickey views the failure on 
Jefferson’s part to overlook the issue of impressment and instead recognize the other 
commercial merits of the treaty was a direct cause of the further breakdown in diplomatic 
relations as well as the War of 1812.28
In his responses to Henry Whitby’s questioning, Caleb Brewster referred to the 
negotiations that began on August 27, 1806 between American commissioners James 
Monroe and William Pinkney and their British counterparts, Lord Holland and Lord 
Auckland. Monroe served as U.S. minister to Great Britain from 1803 to 1807. In the 
summer of 1806, Monroe was joined by William Pinkney, appointed by President 
Jefferson as envoy extraordinary to the Court of St. James in the spring of that year. 
Monroe and Pinkney were participants in a special mission to resolve the maritime 
disputes over neutral rights between the United States and Great Britain, and the talks 
that followed were known as the Monroe-Pinkney Negotiations. These negotiations were 
the next step in Jefferson’s attempt to deal with the increasing hostilities American 
merchant ships and their crews faced as they were sucked into the conflicts between 
France and Britain. Again and again, the neutral rights of American ships were violated 
by both parties as the Napoleonic Wars waged on. By 1807, conditions were getting 
worse for American ships, at risk of having their crews impressed by the British and their
ships seized by both aggressors, France and Britain.
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James Monroe reported the outcome of the Whitby court-martial in a letter James 
Madison on April 20, 1807. Whitby had been acquitted, but Monroe was unable to 
provide Madison with more details, as “he had not heard from Mr. [George] Canning 
since the decision, and no statement is given in the gazettes, of the proceedings of the 
court.” Monroe noted that he had stayed well out of it, believing that the “more the 
management of the trial was left to [the British government], the greater would be its 
responsibility.” The Morning Chronicle reported simply on April 21, 1807, that the 
Court, having “maturely considered the whole, were of opinion that the charge had not 
been proved, and did adjudge Captain WHITBY to be acquitted.”
James Monroe finally returned to the United States, arriving in Norfolk on 
December 13, 1807. His intention was to travel to Washington, D.C. to meet with 
Madison “for the purpose of giving you all the information in my power respecting our 
affairs with the British government.”31 This included a discussion with Madison about 
Foreign Secretary George Canning’s questions concerning impressment and the Jefferson 
Administration’s rejection of the Monroe-Pinkney treaty. Monroe, concerned about his 
political future, insisted to Madison that he be given the opportunity to protect his 
reputation. He wrote to Jefferson as well, in late February 1808, about the “heavy 
censure that had fallen” on him “in the publick opinion. . . in consequence of my having
• • '5' )signed the British treaty.” Monroe informed the president that he intended to respond 
to Madison’s May 1807 letter in which the Secretary of State had outlined his opposition
29 Jam es M onroe to  Jam es M adison, April 2 0 ,1 8 0 7 .
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to the Treaty. He feared that his political future was sunk because of his association with 
the Jefferson Administration’s perceived abandonment of the impressment issue.
All along, however, Monroe and Pinkney asserted that they were following the 
instructions given to them by the State Department. On July 24, 1807, Monroe and 
Pinkney had sent a letter to George Canning requesting a renewal of negotiations 
between the U.S. and Britain, with particular attention to be paid to the problem of 
impressment. “The effect of this practice is, that a flag of an independant [sic] nation is 
being dishonoured, and one of the most essential rights of its sovereignty violated; that 
American citizens, either being mistaken for British subjects or assumed to be such 
without inquiry, are forced from the quiet pursuits of a lawful commerce into the severe 
and dangerous service of a foreign military navy.”
In the wake of the Chesapeake affair, in fact, Monroe had been given instructions 
to negotiate for the “entire abolition of impressment from vessels under the flag of the 
United States.” However, when Canning sent a special envoy, George H. Rose, to 
Washington that summer, “Jefferson and Madison now reversed themselves, telling that 
emissary that they would not insist upon a total end to impressment.”
While Monroe, among others, represented American interests in Britain during 
this time, Americans at home were simultaneously responding to the British closer to 
home, beginning with the events that began off Sandy Hook in April and continued in the 
months that followed. On May 3, 1806, President Jefferson issued a proclamation against 
Henry Whitby, as commander of the Leander and ordered that Whitby be apprehended to 
stand up for the murder of John Pierce. The Leander, Cambrian and Driver were
33 Jam es M onroe and William Pinkney to  G eorge Canning in The Writings o f James M onroe  (July 24,
1807).
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prohibited from entering American ports, along with any ships commanded by Whitby 
and his cohorts. Jefferson further prohibited any American ships from provisioning the 
ships or granting them any other kind of aid.34
Public sentiment clearly reflected the increased rage that Americans felt toward 
the Royal Navy and the British government for turning a blind eye toward the national 
identity of sailors aboard American ships. Many Americans aimed their hostility directly 
toward the Federalists, who made no attempts whatsoever to hide their support for 
continuing positive relations with Britain, particularly in the commercial arena. The 
Democratic-Republicans were less unified, some advocating for more strict policies 
toward Britain, while others, like Jefferson, wanted a more narrowly focused commercial 
attack against Britain.35
Throngs of New Yorkers gathered to remember Pierce, urged by the City Council 
whose members hoped that all citizens would “unite with us on this melancholy 
occasion.” Newspapers printed diagrams of the funeral procession that included 
Pierce’s brother and shipmates who were followed by Mayor Clinton, the members of
37the City Council, other seamen, and “’’citizens, four deep.” The Newport Mercury 
reported that “thousands” attended the service, a “great number” of them “seafaring men 
with weeds in their hats.” The participants were to gather at City Hall at 11 o’clock that 
morning before the procession was “to move through Wall-Street, Pearl-Street,
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Whitehall-Street and Broadway to St. Paul’s Church” where Pierce’s body would be 
interred.
The New York press, however, would not refer to the shots fired at Pierce’s sloop 
as an “incident.” Instead, the headline read “Murder!” in the Morning Chronicle of April 
28th. “Having captured several outward bound American vessels, within the American 
jurisdiction, [the British] have at length consummated their wickedness by the 
MASSACRE of a peaceable AMERICAN. ” That American was Jesse Pierce’s brother, 
John. The newspaper described the incident as an act of murder. Pierce had been killed 
when the H.M.S. Leander “wantonly attacked” the Richard, “within a quarter o f a mile 
from the shore—within the American jurisdiction. . . . ” The press reported that this was 
a “horrible outrage” that “baffles all comment.”
For over a month after Pierce’s death, American newspapers up and down the 
East coast reprinted the details of Britain’s continuing violation of American ships’ and 
seamen’s neutral rights. The tone in the press was clear: Pierce’s death was the
inevitable consequence of a malicious and hostile blockade of American harbors and 
ports on the part of the Royal Navy. Impressment of American seamen and attacks on 
merchant ships on the high seas were bad enough. But the death of seaman Pierce added 
insult to injury. The Leander, along with at least two other Royal Navy ships, was 
anchored in Sandy Hook, lying in wait, or so it seemed, for American vessels returning 
from overseas, hunting down contraband and British sailors masquerading as American 
seamen. John Pierce of 55 Mulberry Street in Lower Manhattan, a native of Delaware, 
was not lost at sea thousands of miles away from home. He was in American waters in
39 M orning Chronicle (NY), April 2 8 ,1 8 0 6
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his own home port when he was killed as a result of the actions of Whitby and his crew 
on board the Leander.
Fraternal organizations, political groups and others quickly resolved to send their 
condolences to the family of John Pierce. One of the first was the Tammany Society, 
founded in 1786 by William Mooney. Mooney was a veteran of the American 
Revolution, having served in the infantry. He organized the Tammany Society to counter 
the existence of the Society of the Cincinnati, the result of Major General Henry Knox’s 
desire to create a fraternity of men who had served as officers in the Continental Army. 
The Tammany Society had branches throughout the country and had developed into an 
important political institution, particularly in New York City, where its members became 
vocal opponents of the Federalist Party. To men like Mooney, the Federalists represented 
elitism in government, just as the Society of the Cincinnati had represented the elitism of 
the military.40 The Tammany Society offered young men in particular the chance to be 
part of a fraternal organization. It is not surprising, then, that the Society’s members 
would voice their opposition to the conduct of the British in support of hard working men 
like those aboard the Richard. The Tammany Society convened to pass a series of 
resolutions, including one to attend the funeral procession and one to request their Grand 
Sachem “to communicate, to the relatives of the deceased, a letter of condolence, 
expressive of the sentiments of the Tammany Society on this subject.”41
While outwardly showing their support for the suffering of the Pierce family and 
all American seamen at risk of being impressed, the death of John Pierce also provided
40 Tammany Society. Journal & Rules o f th e  Council o f Sachem s o f Saint Tammany's Society. M anuscript 
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the Society with an opportunity to express their opposition to the British and any 
American associations with that government. In doing so, the Tammany Society was 
striking a public blow at their political enemies, the Federalists. Two of the resolutions 
reflected these sentiments: “That this society view with the strongest sentiments of 
indignation, the conduct of the British in stationing their ships off our Harbour, and 
violating our lawful commerce.” They next resolved, less explicitly but with a clear 
target in mind, that “this Society is ready to unbury the Tomahawk, whenever their 
COUNTRY’S GOOD requires it.”42
The Chronicle of May 5 reprinted the Tammany Society’s call to order: 
“Brothers! The die is cast--the disturbers of the world’s peace have spilt the innocent 
blood of your countryman, John Pierce!” Tammany secretary James D. Bissett called 
upon the members to wear “bucktails in their hats” and black armbands when they joined 
their fellow mourners in the funeral procession. He warned them, however, “to appear 
without your tomahawks, your bows or your arrows.” He continued, “You will have 
tomahawks well sharpened, arrows pointed and your bows well strung. The enemy are 
on our borders. The black belt of wampum, stained with American blood, it now before 
your eyes in the great Council- Chamber of the nation.”43 The imagery of Native 
American attire and weaponry played a significant role in the workings of the Tammany 
Society with regard to class in America, but that imagery could easily translate to a 
representation of animosity toward the Royal Navy and the king whose actions fueled the 
Revolutionary War itself, George III. Aware of this, the London Morning Chronicle
42 Chronicle Extra (MA), May 5 ,1 8 0 6 .
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noted that “at various meetings violent Resolutions were adopted”44 by many 
organizations.
tViAnother of these meetings was held by Federal Republicans on April 26 in the 
wake of Pierce’s death. Members met at Tontine Coffeehouse to pass a series of 
resolutions calling for the reinforcement of the defenses of the port of New York. The 
members openly criticized the policies of the federal government and its relationship with 
Great Britain, resolving “That an Administration which consents to pay money to avoid 
foreign insolence, or to prevent the violation of national rights, while it sells and 
dismantles its naval force, instead of increasing and preserving it, for the defence of our 
ports and commerce, prostrates the national honour, endangers the public safety, and 
invites both injustice and injury.”45 Clearly, it did not take long for the incident to 
become politicized, at the local, state and federal levels, both inside and outside of New 
York City. The Federal Republicans further advocated that American merchants no 
longer provision British ships at Sandy Hook and that the Jefferson Administration 
respond to the death of John Pierce “with the adoption of prompt and vigorous measures 
to prevent a repetition of such wanton and inhuman conduct, and so vagrant a violation of 
our national sovereignty.”46
Just a decade earlier, George Washington had bid farewell to his fellow citizens 
as his second term ended, famously warning them against the dangers of political 
factionalism:
Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought 
not to be entirely out of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit
44 M orning Chronicle (London), June 4 ,1 8 0 6 .
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of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to 
discourage and restrain it.
It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public 
administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false 
alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally 
riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which 
finds a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party 
passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy 
and will of another. 7
Newspapers became the feeding grounds for both Federalists and Democractic- 
Republicans hungry for incidents at the local level to fuel the intense animosity of the 
political discourse of the Early Republic. In the same article that carried the headline 
“Murder!” with regard to Pierce’s death, the writer continued by focusing not on national 
outrage to the event, but instead to criticize the politicization of Pierce’s death by elected 
officials, particularly DeWitt Clinton, mayor of the city of New York and his uncle, Vice 
President George Clinton, first governor of New York. “We are sorry to be compelled to 
remark that this murderous violence, which ought to awaken all the indignation, and to 
arouse all the energies of every AMERICAN, has already been rendered subservient to 
the purposes of party.”
Why were the Clintons such an affront to solid Americans everywhere? Much of
f t
the front page of May 28 ’s issue of the Chronicle was dedicated to the Clintons. 
According to one article, while New York Governor Morgan Lewis managed to 
appropriate federal funds for the defense of the city’s harbors, DeWitt Clinton, “with a 
view to injure the popularity of Governor Lewis, reported a paltry resolution, to 
DEFEND this all important post, by a few Albany sloops and insignificant flotillas/” This
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was the stand the Federalists took against the Jefferson Administration, as well as the 
Democractic-Republicans like the Clintons who supported him.
Two days after Pierce’s very public funeral, a “numerous and respectable meeting 
of American seamen” took place at Hardy’s tavern on Orange Street. The target of their 
ire was not Henry Whitby, the crew of the Leander, the Royal Navy or even the British 
government. Instead, the sailors gathered in the tavern that night made their own 
unanimous resolutions, including one:”That the monies paid by Mr. Jefferson, for the 
wild lands of Louisiana, would have been better applied in building seventy-four gun 
ships.” The Connecticut Courant reprinted an article “For the Jack-Tars of New York!” 
on May 7, 1806, which reported on the seamen’s other resolutions, including one in 
which the seamen announced that the “present ruling party have treated the American 
Seamen with neglect and injustice—that the Federal party are our Friends, and that they 
deserve our thanks for the exertions in our favor.” Clearly, the death of John Pierce had 
been co-opted by both sides of the political aisle. Jefferson had ignored the plight of 
American sailors for far too long and left them unprotected from ship seizures and 
impressment. The sailors did not hesitate to make their criticism of President Jefferson 
personal, unanimously resolving, too, that “the president. . . had better be employed in 
asserting the rights, defending the honour, and protecting the flag of the country than in 
stuffing raccoon skins and dissecting new discovered animals.”49
It took longer for word of the death of John Pierce to reach the London papers 
than it did for the British press to recognize that party lines had already begun to color the 
story in the United States. “It appears by the American papers that a very great sensation
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has been excited in the United States by an occurrence that lately happened there, but the 
accounts are so disfigured by party prejudice, that little reliance can be placed upon 
them.”50 Aware of the political nature of American newspapers, the London Morning 
Chronicle did not hesitate to remind readers of that fact before providing them with the 
details of the Leander affair.
The Morning Chronicle of London described the incident to its readers: “At the 
end of April, the Leander, Captain WHITBY, cruizing off Sandy Hook, fired at several 
American coasting vessels to bring them to. One of them, the sloop Richard, appearing 
to disobey the signal, after an interval of several minutes, a shot was fired, and the ball 
killed one JOHN PEARCE, a hand on board the vessel.”51 The rest of the account, based 
on the affidavits of Pratt and Jesse Pierce, differed very little from what American papers 
described. It was clear, however, that the British position was that the Royal Navy had 
the right to board American ships returning from the high seas to search for British 
sailors and contraband. Not only that, but the Chronicle also responded to the increasing 
accusations in the American press that that Royal Navy had established a blockade at the 
port of New York. The evidence? The presence of the Leander and the two other British 
ships at Sandy Hook in April was clearly accidental.
However, to justify the actions of Whitby and his crew, the Chronicle continued: 
“[N]o one can suppose that British Officers, commanding ships of war, would do so 
without instructions, and without good right, seeing as they must know the responsibility 
under which they act, and the certain punishment that would overtake them if they 
compromised the character of their country with wanton vexations and unauthorized
50 M orning Chronicle (London), June 4 ,1 8 0 6 .
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aggressions.”52 In other words, since Whitby and his men knew the punishments meted 
out by the Royal Navy for disobedience, they would not be foolish enough to take matters 
into their own hands and fire upon an American ship without cause.
And the Chronicle clearly recognized the level of feeling expressed once Pierce’s 
body was brought ashore, reporting that the emotions of the people were “violently 
enflamed.” The mob “carried the body about in procession, and seized a quantity of 
provisions intended for the British ships on the station, and carried them off to the Alms­
house.” That same day, the London Chronicle printed more details of the night that 
Pierce was killed. Once his body reached shore, it “has been exposed all this day at 
Burling’s Slip, to thousands of spectators. It is to be lodged tomorrow at the Tontine 
coffeehouse or the City-Hall, for public view.” The reprinted letter continued, “The
CO
minds of the inhabitants were wrought up to a pitch of actual madness.”
The rabble-rousing of the seafaring class of Americans did not concern the 
British as much as the impact of the case on diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. The affidavits of Pierce and Pratt, for example, seemed to justify the actions of 
the men aboard the Leander. “There can be no doubt, however, that the shots from the 
Leander were fired to make the Richard bring to. There even appears evidence from 
Pearce’s [sic] deposition that he did not mean to obey.”54 To the Americans, however, 
the attack on the Richard was clearly a violation of their rights as citizens of a country 
whose neutrality had been recognized by the British government. Here is the controversy 
that would lead the United States and Great Britain to war once again just a generation 
removed from the Peace of Paris that ended the American Revolution. Did the Royal
52 M orning Chronicle (London), June 4 ,1 8 0 6 .
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Navy have the authority, the right to press American sailors into service? Did the 
practice of impressment enflame the emotions of the American public so much that the 
federal government had to respond with a declaration of war against the British in 1812? 
Did the American public’s understanding of their rights as citizens of a neutral nation 
inform their actions in the public square as well as in the press in the years leading up to 
the War of 1812?
The meaning of the actions of the crowds of men and women who gathered in the 
streets of New York to attend the funeral of John Pierce in 1806 were co-opted by all 
sorts of political groups, mainly Democractic-Republican, as examples of the kind of 
tyranny that Britain continued to represent. Americans were in danger of being drawn 
back into the fold if Federalists had any say in the matter. It was they who continued to 
curry favor with the British Crown, not the Republicans. The Republicans represented 
the interests of small farmers and other hardworking men of the Republic, not the 
interests of greedy merchants who controlled prices and cheated farming and seafaring 
communities alike.55 During the years prior to the American Revolution, elites aligned 
themselves with merchants, striking out against the British government not because they 
opposed their authority, but because local colonial economies were suffering. Up until the 
eve of the War of 1812, American newspapers invoked the name of Pierce to symbolize 
the injustice of the Royal Navy as impressments continued year after year.
Protests against the Chesapeake-Leopard affair followed in a manner similar to 
what happened in New York in 1806 after the death of John Pierce. It is almost
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impossible to find a timeline of the War of 1812 that does not include or even highlight 
the Chesapeake-Leopard affair as a major event on the road to America’s second war 
with Great Britain. As Paul Gilje has noted, the British attack on the U.S.S. Chesapeake, 
which resulted in the death of four Americans, fueled the outrage American maritime 
communities felt toward Great Britain all along the eastern seaboard.
The conflict took place in Norfolk, Virginia on June 22, 1807 and led to the 
deaths of four men (three that day). Reactions to the death of one seaman in particular, 
Robert MacDonald, who died at the Norfolk Marine Hospital on June 25, 1807, followed 
a pattern similar to that of John Pierce. “An assemblage of civic officials, military 
figures, and common citizens almost 4,000 strong marched through Norfolk streets 
following MacDonald’s remains to Christ’s Church.”56 Cray finds that the actions taken 
by those who responded to the deaths of those four American sailors, John Lawrence, 
James Arnold, and John Shukly (died on board the Chesapeake) and Robert MacDonald 
(died days later at Norfolk Hospital) were inspired by their “revolutionary recollections.” 
The citizens of Norfolk and Portsmouth met and in heady language, referred to the 
“tyranny” of the Royal Navy and the “assassination” of the seamen. They toasted the 
“heroes of the Revolution” at a dinner in Norfolk that “attracted close to 700 persons.” 
He wonders whether this kind of rhetoric changed the nation’s attitude toward the 
American sailor. After all, “British sailors had blasted a broadside against the U.S.S. 
Chesapeake, a community afloat in the new republic’s service.” But the jack tars, Cray 
argues, were marginalized members of American society in the Early Republic. They 
spent most of their time at sea, with a “tenuous attachment to coastal communities.” But 
more than that, while they were on the frontlines when on the high seas and therefore
56 Robert E. Cray, Jr., "Rem em bering th e  USS Chesapeake."
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more vulnerable to the imperial policies of Great Britain than any other group of 
Americans, their plight was mostly ignored by the government. What he concludes about 
this incident is that the government as well as the public had very short attention spans 
when it came to hostilities committed by the British against the maritime community, 
particularly those at sea. By December 1807, newspaper publishers shifted focus and 
covered the Embargo Act.57
57 Cray, "Rem em bering th e  Chesapeake," p. 446-449 , 456.
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Chapter III: Conclusions
The antagonism toward the Royal Navy in 1806 and again in 1807 did not come 
from public outrage at the deaths of great naval officers or heroes. Instead, John Pierce, 
who died aboard the Richard and Robert MacDonald, a crewman aboard the Chesapeake, 
were ordinary seamen. They had not performed a heroic deed or saved other men from a 
watery death in the open seas. In the case of Pierce, he died not far from shore near 
Sandy Hook, fatally injured on deck when the H.M.S. Leander fired at the ship captained 
by his brother, Jesse. Robert MacDonald died in similar fashion just over a year later, 
again the victim of what Americans believed to be the unwarranted aggression of the 
Royal Navy. What is surprising about the public response to these deaths is the economic 
class of the men who died. Pierce served aboard a merchant ship. Consequently, his pay 
and the conditions on board ship were probably better than those experienced by 
MacDonald, who served aboard a U.S. naval frigate. To fill their crews, the Navy looked 
to newly arrived immigrants and lower bom men, not drawn by dreams of shipboard 
glory, but by the promise of a regular income and, more likely, mm. Cray acknowledges 
that there were exceptions, common seamen whose acts of bravery were memorialized in 
the popular press and often in song.1
There was another significant difference between the attack on the Richard and 
the Chesapeake. The British believed that there were British seamen on board and they 
had names. In fact, the British had complained to the State Department without 
satisfaction. Commodore James Barron, captain of the Chesapeake countered that David 
Martin (described in official papers as a “native American” or an “Indian looking man”),
1 Cray, "Rem em bering th e  Chesapeake," p. 452.
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William Ware, (an African American) and John Strachan had been impressed and taken 
aboard the H.M.S. Melampus.
Jenkin Ratford was a British sailor, but when he joined the crew of the 
Chesapeake, he used a false name, John Wilson. The press also reported that Ratford, 
who was eventually executed, had been found aboard the Chesapeake, “hid in the coal 
hole of that frigate.”2 Ratford stated at his trial in Nova Scotia, that he had “hid in the 
coal-hole because of his fear of the Americans making him fight his own country, which 
he declared he would not do on any account.” These words certainly are not surprising 
given that he was facing execution.3 The crew of the Leopard was following the orders 
of Admiral Sir George C. Berkeley, who wanted the desertions to end and to prevent the 
Americans from continuing to harbor the fugitives on board their ships. The United 
States Gazette reported on June 27th that despite an investigation that determined that 
three men wanted by the Royal Navy for desertion were in fact American seamen pressed 
into service, and that “the affair seemed to be settled to mutual satisfaction, that the 
frigate, Leopard had “poured a whole broadside against the Chesapeake,” killing three
4men.
Part of the furor over the Chesapeake stemmed from the deaths of innocent 
Americans. It was not the men accused of deserting from the Royal Navy who were 
injured or killed, but fellow American citizens. MacDonald’s death notice appeared 
throughout the country. The Alexandria Daily Advertiser of July 3, 1807 reported on 
both the sailor’s death as well as his funeral, “attended by nearly 4000” in a procession 
that ended at “Christ Church, where an appropriate, impressive and patriotic discourse
2 Newburyport Herald  (MA) Septem b er 2 2 ,1 8 0 7
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was delivered to a most numerous congregation.”5 This followed a pattern similar to 
Pierce’s a year earlier, with much fanfare and public participation. At the same time that 
MacDonald and the other victims of the Chesapeake were mourned and celebrated, the 
commodore of the ship, James Barron, faced a court martial. Newspapers reported that 
the vessel was “in every respect unprepared for action.”6 Barron himself conceded that 
they were “unprepared and unsuspicious” on board the Chesapeake and able only to 
mount a “feeble” defense.7 “As commander, Barron had failed to perform honorably and 
protect his crew and his men. He was found guilty at his court martial and was 
suspended from service for five years beginning in 1808.
Cray recognizes that Americans were outraged at the way in which individual 
seamen and ships were targeted by the Royal Navy and equated those vile acts with the 
tyranny of the Revolution. But he is less convinced that Americans were really all that 
bothered by impressment. The focus, he argues, of the petitions and resolutions were 
therefore, not against the practice itself. In the case of the Chesapeake, the four men who 
were taken off the ship were soon targets of a politicized press, while the Chesapeake 
affair, along with the death of John Pierce and the ongoing often strained negotiations 
between Britain and the U.S., fueled the Jefferson Administration to take action against 
the British much more strongly than it had the previous year with the Nonimportation 
Act. The Embargo Act of 1807, passed in December, prohibited U.S. ships from carrying 
exports outside the country. The impact, as Paul Gilje points out, was devastating to the 
American, not European, economy.
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Rather than leading to war, Jefferson hope that strong action against Britain in the 
wake of the Chesapeake affairs would lead to concessions on their part. In some ways, 
the federal government’s immediate response was similar to what took place in the wake 
of Pierce’s death. Ports were closed to all Royal Navy ships (in the aftermath of Pierce’s 
death, the three ships involved were banned from U.S. ports) and as happened in New 
York in 1806, American merchants were barred from provisioning Royal Navy ships. 
Succumbing to pressure that had been building since the death of John Pierce, the 
Jefferson Administration approved the construction of more armed naval ships, small
o
gunboats that were cheaper to build than frigates.
As the U.S. neared war with Britain, however, impressment, and more 
specifically, the death of John Pierce and other American sailors “martyred” like him at 
the hands of the Royal Navy, were invoked whenever politicians gathered, campaigned or 
spoke in favor of war. A gathering of Republicans in Charleston in 1808 ended with 
seventeen toasts, among them one to “The 22nd of June, 1807—Poor Pierce’s shade 
complains that we are slow, McDonald’s ghost walks unavenged amongst us!”9 Thomas 
Jefferson’s son-in-law, John W. Eppes, hoping to win re-election to Congress after a 
losing bid the year before, published a plea to Virginia voters in 1812. Outlining the 
crimes committed against the U.S. by the British and pledging to support the war effort if 
reelected, Eppes including the murder of John Pierce by Henry Whitby among them.10
The National Intelligencer reported on the proceedings of the House of 
Representatives in May 1810, including the continuing debates over the proposed
8 A.J. Langguth, Union 1812: The Americans Who Fought the Second W ar fo r  Independence (N ew  York: 
2006), p. 133
9 N ational Intelligencer (DC.) N ovem ber 2 ,1 8 0 8
10 N ational Intelligence (DC), August 1 5 ,1 8 1 2
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reduction to the size of the Army and Navy. Richard M. Johnson, a Democratic- 
Republican from Kentucky reminded his fellow congressmen of the injuries committed 
against the United States repeatedly by the political maneuverings of the French and the 
blatant outrages of the British against American commerce. “I will not go back for 
causes to justify a system of resistance. I would not go back to past events, and I would 
leave out of the question, if gentlemen wish it, the burning our vessels on the high seas— 
the confiscation of our property in port—the imprisonment of our citizens—the murder of 
Pierce—the attack upon the Chesapeake—the impressment of our seamen: and still I 
should find cause to justify the most energetic measures against France and Great 
Britain.”11 Johnson was not ready to argue for war, but instead to support the 
enforcement of the Nonimportation and Embargo acts of 1806 and 1807.
As the House continued debates over naval appropriations in January 1812, fellow 
Republican, William Lowndes of South Carolina argued against Johnson’s assertion that 
five frigates were enough to protect American commerce on the grounds that the eastern 
seaboard was already vulnerable to attacks from a much larger fleet of British ships 
stationed out of Halifax and the West Indies. More than that was the refusal of the 
federal government to allow the ships that Navy did have to take the offensive against 
this threat. “The death of Pierce might have been revenged, and the disgrace of the 
Chesapeake obliterated if these five frigates had been sent a cruising. We did not want
1 "7force but spirit to employ it.”
Teddy Roosevelt may have believed that Americans were particularly prepared to 
fight the British at sea not in spite of, but because of impressment, Henry Adams offers a
11 N ational Intelligencer (DC) May 2 3 ,1 8 1 0
12 National Intelligencer (DC) March 7 ,1 8 1 2
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different view of the American navy on the eve of the War of 1812, at least with regard to
ship-readiness. The naval force included only eight frigates of various strength, all of
which had been built, according to Adams, “by Federalist Congresses before President 
1 ^Jefferson’s time.” Of those ships that were in service, “few” were in “first-rate 
condition.” As far as Adams was concerned, Congress was entirely to blame for lack of 
ships and lack of readiness found in the ships of the line. The original plan for the use of 
the American navy once war was declared, was to station naval ships outside eastern 
ports to protect merchant ships heading from Europe toward those ports with “one to one- 
and-a-half million dollars a week” in commerce. As for seamanship, however, Adams 
wrote that while the American navy demonstrated their inexperience and sometimes plain 
dumb luck right from the start of the war, they also proved their ability to outmaneuver 
the Royal Navy early on, when the U.S. Constitution made its way up the east coast from 
Annapolis to New York and encountered a British squadron sailing from Halifax to New 
York. Less than a month later, the Constitution met the Guerriere off Sandy Hook. “In 
less than thirty minutes from the time we got alongside of the enemy, she was left 
without a spar standing, and the hull cut to pieces in such a manner as to make it difficult 
to keep her above water.” Adams noted in his description of the American victory the 
level of British arrogance that had led to what he called a “duel” between these two ships. 
The American victory, he noted, had to do with the superiority of the American ship in 
size and strength, as well as the “better and more intelligent” American seamen and 
officers, who had a “passionate wish to repay old scores, [giving] them extraordinary
»  14energy.
13 Henry Adams, The W ar o f 1812  (N ew  York: 1999 (reprint)), p. 37.
14 Adams, The W ar o f  1812, p. 39.
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